Tag: economics

US financial markets will remain closed on Monday in observance of Memorial Day, leaving investors with a shortened trading week and a relatively light economic calendar. Attention will center on Thursday’s release of the second estimate for Q1 2026 GDP, alongside April’s core PCE data — the Federal Reserve’s preferred measure of inflation.

Throughout the week, eight Federal Reserve officials are scheduled to speak. With limited new economic data available to shape expectations around the FOMC’s policy direction, investors will closely analyze their remarks for any hawkish signals. Markets are currently pricing in a 62.5% probability of a rate hike by December, up from 50% just one week earlier, though some analysts believe tightening could arrive as soon as July.

Another key uncertainty remains President Donald Trump’s recently announced “likely negotiated” peace agreement. On Saturday, Trump stated that the arrangement would reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s foreign ministry noted that the proposed framework currently consists of a memorandum of understanding as an initial step, with broader negotiations expected within the next 30 to 60 days. However, substantial differences between the two sides still persist.

Meanwhile, global bond yields retreated from recent highs but continued to trade at elevated levels. The yield on the US 10-year Treasury declined to 4.56% after peaking at 4.69%, while the UK 10-year gilt yield eased to 4.90% from 5.19%.

GDP

Thursday’s second estimate of Q1 2026 GDP is expected to remain close to the preliminary 2.0% growth reading. Meanwhile, the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow model is already projecting Q2 growth at 4.3%, supported largely by a sharp increase in business equipment investment.

Core PCED

April’s core PCED — the Federal Reserve’s preferred measure of inflation — will also be released on Thursday. The index rose 3.2% year-over-year in March, accelerating from 3.0% in February, while headline inflation reached 3.5%. With both the latest CPI and PPI figures coming in stronger than expected, markets are increasingly concerned about another upside inflation surprise, which could reinforce expectations for an additional Fed rate hike.

Consumer Confidence

The May Consumer Confidence Index, due Tuesday, is expected to edge higher from April’s reading of 92.8. Market attention will mainly center on the survey’s labor market components, which are anticipated to show modest improvement.

Unemployment

Initial jobless claims, scheduled for release on Thursday, previously came in at 209,000, while the four-week moving average stood at 202,500. Continuing claims were reported at 1.782 million, with the corresponding four-week average at 1.778 million. Overall, the data continues to point toward gradual improvement in labor market conditions.

Regional Business Surveys

This week’s regional Federal Reserve manufacturing surveys will include the Dallas Fed survey on Tuesday and the Richmond Fed survey on Wednesday. Both the national ISM Manufacturing PMI and the average readings from the five regional Fed surveys have shown improvement in recent months, signaling that the manufacturing recovery is becoming increasingly broad-based.

The regional prices-paid average has risen again to 54.9, while the Producer Price Index (PPI) for final demand is already increasing at an annual rate of 6.0%, highlighting persistent inflationary pressures across the production pipeline.

Gold advocates often argue that an expanding supply of dollars automatically weakens the currency: more money in circulation means each dollar buys less, prices rise, and gold serves as the ultimate hedge against this erosion of purchasing power. From this perspective, growth in the money supply is treated as inherently inflationary.

However, this view is overly simplistic for two main reasons. First, it strips away important context around how and why money supply expands. Second, it ignores a crucial driver of inflation that is just as important as supply itself: the velocity of money.

A recent commentary by Michael Oliver of Momentum Structural Analysis prompted a closer look at this debate. He points out that M2 has increased by roughly 45% since 2020, implying a steady erosion in the real value of cash “year by bloody year,” while reinforcing gold’s role as a preferred alternative store of value. While this is a persuasive narrative, the link between money supply expansion and inflation is not as direct or mechanical as often implied, and requires a more nuanced interpretation of M2 dynamics.

It is also worth noting that Oliver’s bullish stance on gold is not based solely on M2 growth. He also cites several additional factors, including the long-term debasement of fiat currencies by central banks, supportive technical structures, declining confidence in central bank credibility, geopolitical tensions increasing safe-haven demand, and persistent fiscal deficits that necessitate continued monetary accommodation.

Context Matters

Simply pointing to M2 growth in isolation is not meaningful without proper context. To clarify this point, we can refer back to a recent Commentary.

If inflation is the key reason for buying or selling gold, then what truly matters is how money supply growth compares to economic growth. On that basis, the picture changes significantly. During 2020 and 2021, M2 expanded far more rapidly than the real economy. However, in the years since, money supply growth has slowed considerably. Over the broader six-year period referenced by Oliver, GDP growth has actually modestly outpaced M2 expansion.

Assuming, for simplicity, that monetary velocity remains stable (a topic we address separately below), the implication is clear: M2 growth was strongly inflationary during 2020–2021, but in the current environment it is, at best, neutral—and may even be disinflationary or deflationary.

The intuition is straightforward. If an economy produces 10% more goods and services, but the money supply only expands by 5%, there is relatively more supply of goods than purchasing power. That imbalance forces either price reductions or rising unsold inventories. In both cases, the pressure on prices is downward rather than upward.

In that sense, if gold is being held primarily as a hedge against inflation, then relying on M2 growth alone may have been a reasonable argument during the pandemic-era monetary surge. But under current conditions, that same rationale is far less convincing without additional supporting factors.

Monetary Velocity Also Matters

Consider a simple thought experiment.

What if the government secretly printed an enormous amount of money, locked it away in a vault, and permanently lost the key? Would that sudden increase in the money supply drive prices of goods and services higher?

The answer is no—it would have virtually no impact.

Now imagine a different scenario: rumors of that hidden stockpile begin to circulate. Even though the money still isn’t being spent, expectations shift. People start to anticipate future spending, and that change in behavior alone could begin to influence prices.

The distinction here is important. Inflation is not determined solely by how much money exists “on paper.” It also depends on how actively that money is used—how quickly it circulates through the economy. This is what economists refer to as monetary velocity.

In other words, price levels are shaped not just by the supply of money, but by the willingness and ability of households, businesses, and institutions to spend it. When velocity is high, money changes hands quickly and exerts more upward pressure on prices. When velocity is low, even a large money supply may have limited inflationary impact.

This is why analyzing inflation through M2 alone can be misleading: without considering velocity, the picture is incomplete.

What Is Monetary Velocity

According to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the velocity of money refers to the rate at which a single unit of currency is used to purchase domestically produced goods and services over a given period of time. In simpler terms, it measures how often each dollar is spent within the economy.

Put differently, it reflects how many times one dollar changes hands to facilitate transactions during a specific timeframe. When monetary velocity rises, it indicates that more economic transactions are taking place between individuals and businesses, signaling a more active flow of spending.

Velocity is therefore influenced by both economic activity and the money supply. A shrinking money supply does not necessarily imply lower prices if economic activity is strong and money is circulating rapidly—velocity can rise and still exert upward pressure on prices. Conversely, even if the money supply expands significantly, inflation may remain muted if that money is not actively being spent, meaning demand for goods and services stays weak and price pressures remain limited.

In short, monetary velocity helps explain why the relationship between money supply and inflation is not mechanical: it is the interaction between how much money exists and how quickly it is used that ultimately matters for price dynamics.

What Impacts Velocity?

Monetary velocity doesn’t move randomly—it reflects how people, businesses, and financial systems behave. A range of economic and psychological factors can either accelerate or slow the rate at which money changes hands.

Factors typically associated with higher velocity

These conditions encourage spending, investing, and faster circulation of money:

• Lower interest rates — reduce the incentive to hold cash, encouraging spending and investment instead
• Strong consumer and business confidence — optimism about the future leads to higher spending activity
• Rising inflation expectations — if people expect prices to increase, they tend to spend sooner rather than later
• Easy credit conditions — abundant lending increases effective purchasing power and transaction volume
• Technological innovation — new products, services, and platforms create additional channels for spending
• Income and wage growth — higher earnings support more frequent and larger transactions
• Economic expansion — growing output naturally leads to more economic exchanges per unit of money

Factors typically associated with lower velocity

These conditions encourage saving, caution, or reduced spending:

• Recessions or economic uncertainty — fear leads households and firms to defer spending
• Expectations of falling prices (deflation) — consumers delay purchases in anticipation of cheaper goods later
• Rising interest rates — saving becomes more attractive, slowing money circulation
• Debt reduction (deleveraging) — paying down loans removes credit-driven money from active circulation
• Aging populations — older demographics generally spend less and save more
• Financial or banking stress — tighter credit conditions reduce lending and the “multiplier” effect of money

The key takeaway

Velocity is ultimately a behavioral and structural variable. It reflects confidence, incentives, credit conditions, and demographics—not just monetary policy or money supply figures. This is why two economies with similar M2 growth can experience very different inflation outcomes depending on how actively money is being used.

M2 and Core CPI

With a clearer understanding of monetary velocity, we can re-examine the common claim among gold advocates that M2 growth and inflation move closely together.

To test this more rigorously, a regression analysis is conducted using quarterly data on M2 and monetary velocity against Core CPI since 2010.

In this context, Core CPI is used instead of headline CPI because it excludes volatile food and energy components. These categories are often influenced by short-term shocks such as geopolitical events or weather conditions, which can obscure underlying inflation trends. By focusing on Core CPI, the analysis aims to capture a more stable and statistically meaningful relationship.

The first step of the analysis examines how M2 alone relates to Core CPI, allowing us to quantify the direct association between money supply growth and underlying inflation over time.

The results suggest that M2 growth, in isolation, has a very weak and statistically insignificant relationship with Core CPI. The R-squared value of 5.13% implies that changes in M2 explain only a small fraction of the variation in Core CPI over the sample period. In practical terms, most inflation dynamics are driven by other factors outside the money supply variable alone.

The negative t-statistic (-1.771) further indicates that the estimated relationship is not only weak but also inversely signed in this model specification—meaning that, within this dataset, higher M2 growth is associated with slightly lower Core CPI. However, this relationship is not statistically robust and should not be interpreted as causal.

Using the regression equation to forecast Core CPI from M2 alone therefore produces unreliable results. As expected from the low explanatory power of the model, the output has little predictive value and is effectively not useful for practical forecasting.

Overall, the takeaway is that M2 by itself is a poor standalone indicator of inflation dynamics, reinforcing the importance of incorporating additional variables—such as velocity, credit conditions, and broader economic activity—when analyzing price pressures.

M2, Velocity, and CPI

Next, we extend the analysis by incorporating monetary velocity into the multiple regression framework alongside M2.

The R-squared value indicates that the relationship becomes substantially stronger when both M2 and monetary velocity are included in the model, with the combined variables explaining more than half of the variation in Core CPI.

In addition, the F-statistic’s near-zero p-value suggests that the overall model is highly statistically significant, meaning there is a very low probability that these results are due to chance.

Finally, when the model’s implied Core CPI is plotted against actual Core CPI, the comparison shows that the combination of money supply and velocity tracks inflation much more closely than M2 alone. This supports the view that inflation dynamics are better understood as a function of both liquidity (M2) and its rate of circulation (velocity), rather than money supply in isolation.

Summary

There are valid reasons to buy and hold gold, but for short-term traders, it is important to understand the narratives that often drive gold price action.

The idea that rising money supply alone explains inflation—and therefore supports higher gold prices—can be misleading. As discussed, this relationship needs to be placed in proper context relative to economic growth. Equally important is not just the quantity of money in circulation, but the rate at which it circulates through the economy, or monetary velocity.

Many widely accepted macro narratives appear intuitive at first glance, but lose explanatory power once examined more closely. It is in these gaps between narrative and reality that investors can better understand the true drivers of asset prices—and reduce the risk of being caught offside when simplified stories fail to hold up in practice.

The Federal Reserve is navigating one of its toughest policy backdrops in years as the conflict with Iran unsettles global energy markets and clouds the outlook for both inflation and growth.

Heightened geopolitical volatility is forcing policymakers into a difficult balancing act: tightening too much could push the economy into recession, while easing prematurely risks fueling inflation again. For now, the most prudent approach appears to be holding rates steady until incoming data provide clearer direction on policy.

Cleveland Fed President Beth Hammack reinforced this stance in a recent AP interview, indicating a preference to keep rates unchanged “for quite some time.” However, she acknowledged flexibility, noting that rate cuts could be warranted if the labor market weakens משמעותfully, while further hikes may be needed if inflation remains persistently above target.

Meanwhile, the Treasury market has shifted its expectations. After a prolonged period of dovish positioning, investors are now assigning a higher probability to near-term rate hikes. This shift is evident in the policy-sensitive 2-year Treasury yield—around 3.84% as of April 6—trading above the median effective Fed funds rate of 3.64%, signaling a renewed tilt toward a more hawkish outlook for the first time since 2022.

The outlook for inflation and economic growth remains uncertain, with rising concern that risks may tilt toward higher prices, slower growth—or both.

IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva warned that “all roads now lead to higher prices and weaker growth,” highlighting a global environment marked by heightened uncertainty. Speaking to Reuters, she pointed to multiple risk factors—including geopolitical tensions, rapid technological change, climate disruptions, and shifting demographics—and stressed the need for vigilance even after the current shock passes.

Against this backdrop, the Federal Reserve’s policy stance remains slightly restrictive. Based on a basic model incorporating unemployment and year-over-year CPI changes, current settings still lean tight, giving the central bank room to remain patient. This supports a wait-and-see approach, allowing policymakers to assess incoming data before making any decisive shifts.

Chicago Fed President Austan Goolsbee signaled that an interest rate increase may be approaching. When asked to assess economic risks on a color scale—from crisis-level red to optimistic green—he described the outlook as “at least orange,” suggesting conditions are concerning and far from ideal. Recent movements in the Treasury market appear to reflect a similar level of caution.

However, because inflation and broader economic data tend to lag, the Federal Reserve is likely to remain patient while it evaluates how the economy responds to the conflict with Iran. The difficulty lies in not delaying too long, as inflation or slowing growth could outpace policy actions, forcing the Fed into a reactive stance. This scenario echoes its delayed response during the 2021–2022 inflation surge—an error policymakers are keen to avoid repeating.

At the same time, moving too quickly carries its own risks, potentially worsening inflationary pressures or hindering growth. Ultimately, the Fed’s task is less about identifying a perfect policy and more about staying flexible in an unpredictable environment. One thing is clear: whenever the next policy move comes, it will be made amid significant uncertainty.

Sources: James Picerno

The U.S. labor market is weakening, reducing the flow of passive dollars into the stock market. Both labor supply and demand are declining simultaneously.

Supply-Side Pressures:

• Immigration into the U.S. has fallen from roughly 2 million annually since 2020 to near zero today.
• Demographics are slowing population growth: from 1.8% post-WWII to 0.5% currently.
• Aging population: Over 4.1 million Baby Boomers are turning 65 each year from 2024–2027 (~11,200 daily).
• Labor Force Participation Rate (LFPR) peaked at 66% with baby boomers, remained stable from 1990–2008, and has now fallen to 62%.

Demand-Side Pressures:

• AI adoption is suppressing hiring, with estimates of 200–300k job losses in 2025 alone.
• Debt-laden economies, rising interest rates, and slower growth depress job creation.
• U.S. bonds’ 40-year bull market has ended; persistent inflation (>2% for 5 years) and $2T annual deficits are fueling a $39T national debt. Higher yields on debt suppress business formation and expansion.

The result: employment growth has stalled. January 2025 had 170.7M workers; today it’s 170.4M. Fewer employed individuals mean less money flowing into 401(k)s and the stock market, reversing trends seen over past decades.

Recent Economic Highlights:

• U.S. spent $11.3B in the first week of the Iran war.
• Home foreclosures rose for the 12th consecutive month in February (+20% YoY).
• Private credit default rate climbed to 9.2%, exceeding 2008 crisis levels. Q4 GDP revised down to 0.7% from 1.4% estimate (Q3 was 4.4%).
• Fed added $18B in base money supply last week.
• January core PCE inflation: 3.1% (well above 2% target); headline: 2.8%. Post-Iran war, energy price spikes will likely push headline higher.
• February PPI: 3.4% YoY; core PPI: 3.9% YoY (rising from January’s 2.9%/3.4%).

The Fed did not cut rates in March, and future rate reductions are unlikely as inflation remains elevated. War-related energy price spikes further complicate monetary stimulus.

Market Valuations:

The stock market is historically expensive, with Total Market Cap/GDP at 220% (vs. 50% in 1975–1990).

Geopolitical Outlook:

• Low probability scenario: Iran surrenders enriched uranium and reopens the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for bombing cessation—unlikely due to U.S. and Israel demanding regime change.
• More probable: war scales down over weeks, partial shipping resumes, oil prices moderate to ~$80/barrel. This scenario limits aggressive market shorts but allows portfolio hedges against stagflation.

Investment Strategy:

• Favor precious metals, energy, and defensive stocks.
• Short rate-sensitive stocks and bonds.
• Stagflation makes buy-and-hold 60/40 portfolios risky; active management through inflation/deflation cycles is a better approach.

Sources: Michael Pento

A few months ago, a government shutdown led to a missed CPI release because the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) lacked sufficient data to calculate the October 2025 figure. The bigger issue, however, was methodological: when compiling the November index, the BLS was effectively required to assume that prices in several major categories—especially rents—were unchanged in October. This created an artificial drop in year-over-year inflation.

While some of that distortion has already begun to reverse, a more significant rebound is expected in a few months when the Owners’ Equivalent Rent (OER) survey rotation triggers a sharp offsetting increase—precisely six months after the initial dip. Until that adjustment plays out, inflation data will remain hard to interpret, and the annual comparisons will understate true price pressures. So claims that the latest report shows the smallest yearly increase in core inflation since 2021, suggesting the Federal Reserve is near its target, are misleading.

In reality, core year-over-year inflation is roughly 0.25%–0.3% higher than reported. Markets for CPI fixings already anticipate headline inflation rising to about 2.82% in four months—not because of energy prices, but due to this statistical catch-up.

January is typically a challenging month for inflation data anyway, as businesses often offer discounts in December before implementing annual price hikes in January. Because these adjustments are irregular, they are difficult to seasonally adjust, making January surprises common. This time, consensus forecasts called for a 0.27% month-over-month rise in headline CPI and 0.31% in core, with some estimates—such as from Barclays—as high as 0.39% for core. Much of the speculation centered on whether remaining tariff-related price increases would be passed through at the start of the year. Ultimately, they were not. The actual figures came in at +0.17% for headline and +0.30% for core.

The weaker headline reading was largely due to gasoline pricing dynamics. Although gas prices increased over the course of January, the monthly average was still lower than December’s average, because prices had fallen sharply in December. Since the BLS calculates CPI based on average monthly prices rather than end-of-month levels, this produced a softer headline figure.

Core inflation, meanwhile, appeared close to target at first glance: the 2.5% year-over-year rate is the lowest since March 2021. Yet the 0.30% monthly increase was the third-highest in the past year and translates to an annualized pace of 3.6%. That hardly signals a smooth return to 2% inflation—raising questions about whether it is truly “mission accomplished” for the Fed.

Core inflation was also somewhat flattered by a sharp 1.84% month-over-month decline in used car prices. In reality, used car prices did rise in January, but by less than the typical seasonal pattern, which translated into a sizable seasonally adjusted drop and created a noticeable drag on the core figure. (That said, it’s important not to dismiss components simply because they don’t align with the broader narrative.) Overall, core goods inflation slowed to 1.1% year over year from 1.4%, while core services edged down to 2.9% from 3.0%.

Although core goods inflation declined more than expected due to the sharp move in used cars, some moderation isn’t surprising. The real issue isn’t whether core goods will reaccelerate to 3–4%, but whether it remains in positive territory or slips back into the persistent deflation that characterized the sector for many years. That distinction matters, even if core goods make up only about 20% of the CPI basket. Until recently, the narrative centered on tariffs; going forward, it may shift toward onshoring. The decades-long trend of goods deflation—driven by offshoring production to low-wage countries—may not reassert itself if manufacturing activity continues to migrate back. That’s the broader theme to monitor, though it’s not the main takeaway from January 2026’s data.

On autos specifically, new car prices posted a modest increase. It’s worth considering how changes in sales composition might evolve now that electric vehicles are no longer being actively promoted by the executive branch. Traditional gasoline-powered cars tend to be cheaper upfront, so if buyers shift back toward them—absent tax incentives for EVs—the average transaction price could decline. However, it’s unclear how significantly overall sales patterns will change, or how production strategies will adjust now that automakers may feel less pressure to meet EV quotas. It’s also uncertain how granular the Bureau of Labor Statistics survey is in accounting for shifts in fleet composition. If there is any measurable impact on CPI, it would likely be slightly negative—and probably modest in size.

As for rents, Owners’ Equivalent Rent (OER) rose 0.22% month over month, down from 0.31% previously, while Rent of Primary Residence increased 0.25%, slightly below last month’s 0.27%. The month-to-month trend in OER shows a clear deceleration—though notably, it omits the artificial zero recorded in October due to the earlier data disruption.

While the slowdown is evident, my model suggests the pace should now be stabilizing around this level rather than continuing to decline sharply. In other words, rents are cooling, but likely nearing a plateau. That isn’t the defining story of January 2026—but it may well become one of the central inflation themes for the rest of 2026.

Medicinal drug prices slipped 0.15% month over month. Some observers had anticipated a much larger decline, partly due to efforts by the Trump Administration to push manufacturers to align U.S. drug prices more closely with those abroad. So far, however, no clear downward trend is evident. A potentially more consequential development is the Trump RX initiative, aimed at increasing pricing transparency and reducing the role of intermediaries in the highly opaque pharmaceutical distribution chain—long dominated by three major wholesalers and three large pharmacy benefit managers.

If successful, it could meaningfully reduce out-of-pocket drug costs for consumers. That said, when medications are paid for by insurers rather than directly by households, the impact does not show up straightforwardly in the CPI, appearing only indirectly—an accounting nuance that complicates interpretation. In short, consumer drug prices may decline, but the timing and visibility of that effect in CPI data remain uncertain.

The most encouraging element of the report was the continued slowdown in core services excluding rents—often referred to as “supercore” inflation—which eased further even as airfares jumped 6.5% on the month.

Gotcha. The apparent improvement in “supercore” inflation is another illusion created by the missing October data, which flatters the year-over-year comparison. On a month-over-month basis, core services ex-rents actually surged 0.59% (seasonally adjusted)—the largest increase in a year.

Even so, the broader trend may still be one of gradual cooling, particularly as median wage growth continues to decelerate. Admittedly, that data is also somewhat noisy at the moment. Still, the gap between median wage growth and median inflation remains around 1%, suggesting real income growth is positive, even if inflation progress is bumpier than headline figures imply.

There are tentative signs that wage growth’s downward drift may be stabilizing. If so, that would naturally limit how quickly supercore inflation can cool. At the same time, brewing cost pressures in insurance markets are likely to surface over the next six months. Still, none of that defines January 2026.

The real story this month is that inflation data remain clouded by the government-shutdown gap. The missing October observations continue to flatter year-over-year comparisons, overstating the degree of progress. That statistical quirk makes it easier for the Administration to claim victory, even though underlying inflation does not appear to be cleanly converging back to target.

Assuming the Federal Reserve recognizes these distortions, the policy outlook seems relatively straightforward. Core inflation—abstracting from the shutdown gap—appears to be running near 3.5%, labor market data have surprised to the upside, and the current Fed leadership has shown little inclination to accommodate political pressure. Under those conditions, there is scant reason to expect a near-term adjustment in overnight rates; if anything, the argument for tightening may be stronger than for easing.

To be fair, rents continue to decelerate even after adjusting for the October distortion, though my model suggests that slowdown is unlikely to persist much further. Even if it does, a return to outright housing deflation seems improbable. Moderation in supercore inflation is encouraging, but probably insufficient to deliver the degree of cooling the Fed would require. Core goods inflation also looks to have peaked; the open question is whether it settles into low positive territory or slips back into deflation.

Taken together, my modeling suggests that median inflation around 3.5% (excluding the shutdown effect) may represent something close to a new equilibrium. It’s not unreasonable to see constructive signals in the recent data, but neither do they justify expectations of imminent easing. If disinflation trends persist and leadership dynamics shift—potentially with someone like Kevin Warsh assuming the chair—the door to rate cuts later in the year could open.

But that is not January 2026’s story.

Sources: Michael Ashton