Introduction
After months of rising tensions, the United States launched a major military operation in Venezuela on 3 January 2026, resulting in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. U.S. President Donald Trump confirmed the operation, saying Washington would administer Venezuela until a stable transition government could be established. This marks one of the most dramatic U.S. interventions in Latin America in decades, with Maduro removed from power and taken into U.S. custody.
Maduro, long a focal point of U.S. sanctions and foreign policy pressure, was transported to the United States to face federal charges—such as narco‑terrorism and drug trafficking—filed in the Southern District of New York.
Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, and the sudden change in leadership carries significant geopolitical and economic implications well beyond its borders.
Why Did the US Capture Maduro?
Nicolás Maduro rose through the Venezuelan political system under socialist leader Hugo Chávez and became president in 2013. His time in power was widely criticized domestically and internationally, with opponents accusing him of suppressing dissent, restricting freedoms, and holding elections that lacked credibility.
Relations with Washington deteriorated sharply, especially under the Trump administration. U.S. officials accused Maduro’s government of involvement in drug trafficking and creating conditions that fueled migration toward the United States. They also branded elements of his regime—including the Cartel of the Suns—as a terrorist organization.
Tensions escalated in 2025 when the U.S. increased the bounty for Maduro’s arrest to $50 million and expanded military pressure in the region, including strikes on vessels the U.S. claimed were tied to drug smuggling.
On 3 January 2026, after months of military buildup and diplomatic pressure, U.S. forces launched a major operation in Venezuela—code‑named Operation Absolute Resolve—that resulted in the capture of Maduro and his wife. The U.S. government framed the intervention as a law‑enforcement action tied to longstanding criminal charges against Maduro, including narcoterrorism.
The United States claims that Venezuelan officials were engaged in government‑backed drug trafficking, asserting links with the so‑called Cartel of the Suns, which Washington has designated as a terrorist organization—a claim Maduro vehemently rejects. He argues that U.S. actions were aimed at forcing regime change and securing control over Venezuela’s vast oil riches.
Only hours before his detention, Maduro made his final public appearance as president when he hosted China’s special envoy, Qiu Xiaoqi, at the Miraflores Palace to discuss bilateral relations—an event that highlighted Caracas’s reliance on foreign partnerships for political support. Shortly after that meeting, explosions were reported across Caracas.
The event went beyond a simple arrest; it sent a broader strategic message, particularly to countries like China and Iran, undermining the belief that the U.S. would refrain from acting against governments supported by foreign adversaries.
Drill, Baby, Drill
A major strategic factor behind U.S. actions in Venezuela appears to be securing access to its vast energy resources. Venezuela sits on the largest proven oil reserves on the planet, with estimates from Wood Mackenzie suggesting roughly 241 billion barrels of recoverable crude, making it a uniquely significant player in global oil markets.
Top Countries by Proven Oil Reserves (Billion Barrels)
However, Venezuela’s track record of oil output underscores just how challenging it has been to tap into its vast reserves. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the nation was capable of producing close to 3 million barrels per day—a level that made it one of the world’s top crude exporters. But political turmoil, labor strikes, and the restructuring of the oil sector under Hugo Chávez triggered a prolonged decline. The downturn was steepened further by U.S. sanctions starting in 2017, which restricted investment, technology, and exports, driving production down sharply. After bottoming out around 374,000–500,000 bpd during the worst of the crisis, output has only modestly recovered in recent years and remains in the range of approximately 800,000–900,000 bpd.
Historical Total Venezuelan Supply
Expectations that Venezuelan oil output could quickly rebound may overstate what’s realistically achievable. History shows that even after major disruptions, rebuilding oil production takes many years and vast investment. For example, Iraq needed almost a decade and well over $200 billion in capital to restore its output after the Iraq War, while Libya still has not returned to its pre‑2011 production levels.
Venezuela’s challenges are even more severe. Most of its reserves are extra‑heavy crude that demands upgrading and blending with diluents before it can be transported and refined, a costly and technical process. Years of underinvestment, international sanctions, the erosion of PDVSA’s workforce, and the deterioration of infrastructure have compounded these production hurdles. Pipelines, upgraders, and refineries have been left in poor condition, and limited access to modern technology continues to restrict any rapid recovery.
While PDVSA has claimed that facilities were not physically damaged in recent events—suggesting limited short‑term disruption—oil markets appear capable of absorbing this uncertainty for now. Inventories remain ample, and OPEC+ has signalled that its voluntary cuts of around 1.65 million bpd could be reversed if necessary to balance markets.
In a scenario where a pro‑U.S. government enables sanctions relief and attracts foreign investment, Venezuelan exports could gradually recover. But bringing production back to around 3 million bpd would take many years and substantial infrastructure upgrades. U.S. leadership has indicated that American oil companies would play a role in operating and developing Venezuela’s oil sector, though analysts note that the heavy crude’s technical challenges and investment risks remain significant.
Meanwhile, global oil markets are structurally tightening, with world consumption exceeding 101 million bpd driven by demand growth in the U.S., China, and India. Any short‑term impact on supply may show up as a modest increase in geopolitical risk premiums, but over time, the sidelined Venezuelan barrels—currently producing around 800,000–900,000 bpd—could eventually add supply and influence prices if output scales up gradually.
In addition to oil, Venezuela sits on a wealth of mineral resources. Large deposits of iron ore, bauxite, gold, nickel, copper, zinc and other metallic minerals are concentrated mainly in the southern Guayana Shield region. The country also ranks among Latin America’s largest holders of gold, and geological assessments identify significant iron and bauxite resources alongside reserves of coal, antimony, molybdenum and other base metals.
Despite this geological potential, commercial mining activity remains very limited. Most non‑oil mineral sectors contribute only a tiny fraction of Venezuela’s economic output, and substantial foreign investment has largely been absent, meaning much of the nation’s mineral wealth has yet to be developed into large‑scale production.
The Ongoing Economic Battle Between the United States and China
Competition between modern empires today is no longer about direct confrontation but about control over key inputs. Energy, metals, and critical materials form the foundation of the modern world. When leaders signal a willingness to secure these resources directly, markets should interpret this not as mere rhetoric, but as a concrete resource strategy.
The rivalry between the United States and China is fundamentally structural rather than ideological. The U.S. is rich in energy but dependent on imported metals and rare earths. China dominates metals processing but imports around 70% of its crude oil. Each side is strong where the other is vulnerable, and both seek to turn this imbalance into strategic advantage.
Control over energy flows also carries monetary implications. Influence over Venezuelan oil is not only about supply, but also about reinforcing the petrodollar and preventing the rise of the petroyuan.
There is also a regional dimension to this rivalry. China has steadily increased its presence in Latin America through infrastructure projects and commodity-backed financing. Recent U.S. moves indicate an effort to reassert dominance in the Western Hemisphere, compelling Beijing to compete on less advantageous terms. The Trump administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy elevated the region to a core priority, effectively reviving the logic of the Monroe Doctrine—rebranded as the “Donroe Doctrine.” The aim is to bring strategically important natural resources, especially critical minerals and rare earths, under U.S.-aligned corporate control while building a hemisphere-wide supply chain that reduces dependence on China.
Across much of South America, governments are edging closer to Washington, leaving Brazil increasingly isolated. This is significant given President Lula’s openly left-leaning stance and his consistent alignment with Russia, China, and Iran. Following Trump’s capture of Maduro, betting markets on Kalshi assign a 90% probability that the presidents of Colombia and Peru will be out of office before 2027. At the same time, President Trump has again stated that Greenland should become part of the United States, reinforcing a broader strategy centered on securing critical assets.
Which Assets Could Gain from “Nation Building” in Venezuela?
A political transition in Venezuela would most directly benefit assets tied to sovereign debt restructuring, energy infrastructure, and the oil supply chain.
Venezuelan bonds are currently priced at roughly 25–35 cents on the dollar, reflecting the impact of sanctions and ongoing legal uncertainty. Under a regime-change scenario, several analysts project potential recoveries in the 30–55 cent range, supported by the prospects of debt restructuring and the easing or removal of sanctions.
Ashmore continues to rank among the largest institutional holders of Venezuelan sovereign debt. Advisory firms such as Houlihan Lokey—financial adviser to the Venezuela Creditor Committee—and Lazard, a veteran of major sovereign restructurings (including Greece and Ukraine), would likely stand to gain from the sheer scale and complexity of any debt workout. In such processes, advisers typically earn success-based fees and function as the “picks and shovels” of restructuring. Venezuela’s debt structure is widely regarded as one of the most intricate ever assembled.
Reviving Venezuela’s oil industry would demand swift rehabilitation of aging infrastructure. Technip, which historically designed much of the country’s core oil facilities, is well placed to play a leading role given its proprietary expertise—particularly if emergency repairs are fast-tracked through sole-source or no-bid contracts. Graham Corporation, a supplier of vacuum ejector systems used in heavy-oil upgrading and refining, could also benefit, since Venezuela’s crude requires vacuum distillation to prevent it from solidifying into coke.
Before exports can meaningfully increase, Venezuela will need to import substantial volumes of diluent (such as naphtha or natural gasoline) to transport its heavy crude through pipelines. Targa Resources, operator of the Galena Park Marine Terminal in Houston—a major LPG and naphtha export hub—would be a natural beneficiary if Venezuela pivots back to U.S. diluent supplies, replacing current inflows from Iran.
The clearest corporate beneficiary of regime change and nation-building in Venezuela is Chevron (NYSE: CVX). Unlike other U.S. energy majors that exited the country, Chevron has maintained an on-the-ground presence. It retains the workforce, regulatory approvals (through OFAC), and operational assets—most notably Petroboscan and Petropiar—that position it to scale up production quickly. Exxon Mobil (NYSE: XOM) and ConocoPhillips (NYSE: COP), both of which hold legacy claims and arbitration awards stemming from past expropriations, could also regain market access or pursue compensation under a revised legal and political framework.
Refiners along the U.S. Gulf Coast—such as Valero Energy (NYSE: VLO), Phillips 66 (NYSE: PSX), and Marathon Petroleum (NYSE: MPC)—were purpose-built to handle heavy, sour crude like that produced in Venezuela. Since the imposition of sanctions, these companies have had to rely on costlier substitute feedstocks. A resumption of Venezuelan supply would reduce input costs and support refining margins, assuming end-product demand remains stable.
At the sector level, a significant increase in Venezuelan output would likely weigh on oil prices, which would be negative for crude producers but positive for consumer-oriented equities. Lower energy prices are inherently deflationary and could translate into lower bond yields—conditions that are generally supportive of risk assets, all else equal.
Note: This section is for analytical purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.
Venezuela: What Comes Next for the Economy and Markets?
In a characteristically Trump-like approach, President Trump initially stated that the United States would “administer” Venezuela during the transition period. U.S. officials later confirmed that approximately 15,000 troops would remain stationed in the Caribbean, with the option of further intervention if the interim authorities in Caracas failed to comply with Washington’s demands.
Venezuela’s Supreme Court subsequently named Vice President Delcy Rodríguez as interim president. A close ally of Maduro since 2018, Rodríguez previously oversaw much of the oil-dependent economy and the country’s intelligence structures, placing her firmly within the existing power framework. She signaled a willingness “to cooperate” with the Trump administration, hinting at a potentially dramatic reset in relations between the two long-hostile governments.
International observers, including the United Nations and the Carter Center, have concluded that Venezuela’s 2024 elections lacked legitimacy and fell short of international standards. Independently verified tally sheets reviewed by analysts indicated that opposition candidate Edmundo González secured around 67% of the vote, compared with roughly 30% for Maduro.
At the same time, María Corina Machado—Nobel Peace Prize laureate and a leading figure in Venezuela’s opposition—is expected to return to the country later this month and has said the opposition is ready to take power. President Trump, however, has publicly cast doubt on the breadth of her support among the Venezuelan population.
In this context, three potential scenarios appear likely, as outlined by Gavekal Research:
- “Soft” Military Rule
In the near term, the most probable outcome is the continuation of the current power structure under Rodríguez and the armed forces. For this arrangement to endure, it would likely require a pragmatic shift toward U.S. priorities—embracing a more business-friendly approach and loosening ties with traditional partners such as Russia, China, and Iran. Washington may be willing to accept this scenario if it ensures political stability and reliable access to energy supplies.
- Democratic Transition
A negotiated move toward civilian governance would hinge largely on how new elections are structured. Allowing participation from the Venezuelan diaspora could significantly reshape the results, whereas restricting voting to residents inside the country would be more likely to benefit factions linked to the existing regime.
- “Libya Redux” (State Breakdown)
The most destabilizing scenario would involve the collapse of central authority, triggering internal military conflict and the proliferation of armed groups. Such an outcome would heighten the risk of civil strife, renewed migration pressures, and severe disruptions to oil production and global energy markets.
Sources: Investing
THE ETERNAL SOVEREIGN 