Oil prices weakened yesterday after President Trump said Venezuela would supply large volumes of sanctioned crude to the United States.
Energy
Developments in Venezuela remain in the spotlight, adding further downside pressure to oil prices. President Trump said Venezuela is prepared to sell up to 50 million barrels of sanctioned crude to the United States, a move that could also immediately weigh on Canadian crude exports to the U.S.
Such a deal would effectively open a release channel for Venezuelan oil, which has struggled to reach global markets due to a U.S. blockade on sanctioned tankers entering and leaving the country. Redirecting these barrels to the U.S. could ease storage constraints and reduce the need for Venezuela to curb production.
The U.S. Department of Energy confirmed that Venezuelan crude is already being marketed internationally, while Trump’s energy secretary stated that Washington intends to maintain long-term control over future Venezuelan oil sales. This strategy is reinforced by the continued tanker blockade, with two additional vessels reportedly seized yesterday.
Washington’s growing influence over Venezuela’s oil sector also raises uncertainty about the country’s future role within OPEC.
Meanwhile, Energy Information Administration (EIA) data showed U.S. crude inventories fell by 3.83 million barrels last week, the sharpest draw since late October. However, product balances were more bearish, as gasoline stocks rose by 7.7 million barrels and distillate inventories increased by 5.6 million barrels.
These inventory builds point to refinery utilization remaining firm, while implied demand for both products softened somewhat over the past week.
European gas prices moved higher yesterday, with TTF closing more than 2.5% up on the day. Colder conditions across parts of Europe, along with forecasts for below-average temperatures in the days ahead, are supporting the market. The current cold spell has also accelerated storage drawdowns, with EU gas inventories now at 58% of capacity, compared with a five-year average of 72%.
The latest positioning data show that investment funds cut their net short exposure in TTF for a third straight week. Funds purchased 6.2 TWh during the latest reporting period, reducing their net short position to 72.4 TWh.
Oil prices climbed during Asian trading on Thursday, regaining some losses after sharp declines triggered by worries over rising Venezuelan crude supplies.
Additionally, stronger-than-anticipated weekly declines in U.S. oil inventories supported the price recovery. Ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine also contributed to maintaining a risk premium in the market.
March Brent crude futures increased by 0.7% to reach $60.38 per barrel, while West Texas Intermediate (WTI) futures also gained 0.7%, settling at $56.28 per barrel as of 20:25 ET (01:25 GMT). Both benchmarks had fallen more than 1% over the previous two sessions.
Attention turns to US – Venezuela oil agreement after Trump highlights up to $3 billion in planned crude sales.
Oil markets are closely watching the impact of a new agreement between the U.S. and Venezuela on global oil supplies.
U.S. President Donald Trump announced on Tuesday that Venezuela will deliver between 30 million and 50 million barrels of oil to the U.S., valued at up to $3 billion, shortly after U.S. forces detained Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.
Trump also appeared to encourage multiple U.S. oil companies to expand production activities in Venezuela, with Chevron Corp (NYSE: CVX) leading these efforts. According to Reuters, Chevron is negotiating to broaden its license to operate in the country.
Currently, Chevron is the only major U.S. oil company active in Venezuela, benefiting from special government exemptions that shield it from stringent sanctions imposed on the nation.
Markets are worried that a significant rise in Venezuelan oil output could further swell global supplies, adding to prevailing fears of an oil glut in 2026. Traders are already pricing in ample supply conditions, with expectations that any additional barrels from Venezuela might weigh on crude prices.
However, analysts caution that any meaningful increase in Venezuelan production is unlikely to happen quickly, given the country’s deep political instability and the extensive investment needed to rebuild its dilapidated oil infrastructure after recent upheavals.
A Financial Times report also noted that U.S. oil firms are seeking strong legal and financial guarantees from the U.S. government before committing to major investments in Venezuela’s oil sector, reflecting industry hesitancy amid uncertain policy and market conditions.
U.S. crude stockpiles decline beyond forecasts
Government data released Wednesday revealed that U.S. oil inventories fell by 3.8 million barrels in the week ending January 2, significantly exceeding expectations of a 1.2 million barrel decline.
This reduction was almost double the 1.9 million barrel draw reported the previous week, bolstering confidence that demand remains robust in the world’s largest fuel consumer.
Attention this week centers on several key U.S. economic reports, especially the December nonfarm payrolls data set to be released on Friday, which is expected to influence interest rate forecasts.
After months of rising tensions, the United States launched a major military operation in Venezuela on 3 January 2026, resulting in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. U.S. President Donald Trump confirmed the operation, saying Washington would administer Venezuela until a stable transition government could be established. This marks one of the most dramatic U.S. interventions in Latin America in decades, with Maduro removed from power and taken into U.S. custody.
Maduro, long a focal point of U.S. sanctions and foreign policy pressure, was transported to the United States to face federal charges—such as narco‑terrorism and drug trafficking—filed in the Southern District of New York.
Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, and the sudden change in leadership carries significant geopolitical and economic implications well beyond its borders.
Why Did the US Capture Maduro?
Nicolás Maduro rose through the Venezuelan political system under socialist leader Hugo Chávez and became president in 2013. His time in power was widely criticized domestically and internationally, with opponents accusing him of suppressing dissent, restricting freedoms, and holding elections that lacked credibility.
Relations with Washington deteriorated sharply, especially under the Trump administration. U.S. officials accused Maduro’s government of involvement in drug trafficking and creating conditions that fueled migration toward the United States. They also branded elements of his regime—including the Cartel of the Suns—as a terrorist organization.
Tensions escalated in 2025 when the U.S. increased the bounty for Maduro’s arrest to $50 million and expanded military pressure in the region, including strikes on vessels the U.S. claimed were tied to drug smuggling.
On 3 January 2026, after months of military buildup and diplomatic pressure, U.S. forces launched a major operation in Venezuela—code‑named Operation Absolute Resolve—that resulted in the capture of Maduro and his wife. The U.S. government framed the intervention as a law‑enforcement action tied to longstanding criminal charges against Maduro, including narcoterrorism.
The United States claims that Venezuelan officials were engaged in government‑backed drug trafficking, asserting links with the so‑called Cartel of the Suns, which Washington has designated as a terrorist organization—a claim Maduro vehemently rejects. He argues that U.S. actions were aimed at forcing regime change and securing control over Venezuela’s vast oil riches.
Only hours before his detention, Maduro made his final public appearance as president when he hosted China’s special envoy, Qiu Xiaoqi, at the Miraflores Palace to discuss bilateral relations—an event that highlighted Caracas’s reliance on foreign partnerships for political support. Shortly after that meeting, explosions were reported across Caracas.
The event went beyond a simple arrest; it sent a broader strategic message, particularly to countries like China and Iran, undermining the belief that the U.S. would refrain from acting against governments supported by foreign adversaries.
Drill, Baby, Drill
A major strategic factor behind U.S. actions in Venezuela appears to be securing access to its vast energy resources. Venezuela sits on the largest proven oil reserves on the planet, with estimates from Wood Mackenzie suggesting roughly 241 billion barrels of recoverable crude, making it a uniquely significant player in global oil markets.
Top Countries by Proven Oil Reserves (Billion Barrels)
However, Venezuela’s track record of oil output underscores just how challenging it has been to tap into its vast reserves. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the nation was capable of producing close to 3 million barrels per day—a level that made it one of the world’s top crude exporters. But political turmoil, labor strikes, and the restructuring of the oil sector under Hugo Chávez triggered a prolonged decline. The downturn was steepened further by U.S. sanctions starting in 2017, which restricted investment, technology, and exports, driving production down sharply. After bottoming out around 374,000–500,000 bpd during the worst of the crisis, output has only modestly recovered in recent years and remains in the range of approximately 800,000–900,000 bpd.
Historical Total Venezuelan Supply
Expectations that Venezuelan oil output could quickly rebound may overstate what’s realistically achievable. History shows that even after major disruptions, rebuilding oil production takes many years and vast investment. For example, Iraq needed almost a decade and well over $200 billion in capital to restore its output after the Iraq War, while Libya still has not returned to its pre‑2011 production levels.
Venezuela’s challenges are even more severe. Most of its reserves are extra‑heavy crude that demands upgrading and blending with diluents before it can be transported and refined, a costly and technical process. Years of underinvestment, international sanctions, the erosion of PDVSA’s workforce, and the deterioration of infrastructure have compounded these production hurdles. Pipelines, upgraders, and refineries have been left in poor condition, and limited access to modern technology continues to restrict any rapid recovery.
While PDVSA has claimed that facilities were not physically damaged in recent events—suggesting limited short‑term disruption—oil markets appear capable of absorbing this uncertainty for now. Inventories remain ample, and OPEC+ has signalled that its voluntary cuts of around 1.65 million bpd could be reversed if necessary to balance markets.
In a scenario where a pro‑U.S. government enables sanctions relief and attracts foreign investment, Venezuelan exports could gradually recover. But bringing production back to around 3 million bpd would take many years and substantial infrastructure upgrades. U.S. leadership has indicated that American oil companies would play a role in operating and developing Venezuela’s oil sector, though analysts note that the heavy crude’s technical challenges and investment risks remain significant.
Meanwhile, global oil markets are structurally tightening, with world consumption exceeding 101 million bpd driven by demand growth in the U.S., China, and India. Any short‑term impact on supply may show up as a modest increase in geopolitical risk premiums, but over time, the sidelined Venezuelan barrels—currently producing around 800,000–900,000 bpd—could eventually add supply and influence prices if output scales up gradually.
In addition to oil, Venezuela sits on a wealth of mineral resources. Large deposits of iron ore, bauxite, gold, nickel, copper, zinc and other metallic minerals are concentrated mainly in the southern Guayana Shield region. The country also ranks among Latin America’s largest holders of gold, and geological assessments identify significant iron and bauxite resources alongside reserves of coal, antimony, molybdenum and other base metals.
Despite this geological potential, commercial mining activity remains very limited. Most non‑oil mineral sectors contribute only a tiny fraction of Venezuela’s economic output, and substantial foreign investment has largely been absent, meaning much of the nation’s mineral wealth has yet to be developed into large‑scale production.
The Ongoing Economic Battle Between the United States and China
Competition between modern empires today is no longer about direct confrontation but about control over key inputs. Energy, metals, and critical materials form the foundation of the modern world. When leaders signal a willingness to secure these resources directly, markets should interpret this not as mere rhetoric, but as a concrete resource strategy.
The rivalry between the United States and China is fundamentally structural rather than ideological. The U.S. is rich in energy but dependent on imported metals and rare earths. China dominates metals processing but imports around 70% of its crude oil. Each side is strong where the other is vulnerable, and both seek to turn this imbalance into strategic advantage.
Control over energy flows also carries monetary implications. Influence over Venezuelan oil is not only about supply, but also about reinforcing the petrodollar and preventing the rise of the petroyuan.
There is also a regional dimension to this rivalry. China has steadily increased its presence in Latin America through infrastructure projects and commodity-backed financing. Recent U.S. moves indicate an effort to reassert dominance in the Western Hemisphere, compelling Beijing to compete on less advantageous terms. The Trump administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy elevated the region to a core priority, effectively reviving the logic of the Monroe Doctrine—rebranded as the “Donroe Doctrine.” The aim is to bring strategically important natural resources, especially critical minerals and rare earths, under U.S.-aligned corporate control while building a hemisphere-wide supply chain that reduces dependence on China.
Across much of South America, governments are edging closer to Washington, leaving Brazil increasingly isolated. This is significant given President Lula’s openly left-leaning stance and his consistent alignment with Russia, China, and Iran. Following Trump’s capture of Maduro, betting markets on Kalshi assign a 90% probability that the presidents of Colombia and Peru will be out of office before 2027. At the same time, President Trump has again stated that Greenland should become part of the United States, reinforcing a broader strategy centered on securing critical assets.
Which Assets Could Gain from “Nation Building” in Venezuela?
A political transition in Venezuela would most directly benefit assets tied to sovereign debt restructuring, energy infrastructure, and the oil supply chain.
Venezuelan bonds are currently priced at roughly 25–35 cents on the dollar, reflecting the impact of sanctions and ongoing legal uncertainty. Under a regime-change scenario, several analysts project potential recoveries in the 30–55 cent range, supported by the prospects of debt restructuring and the easing or removal of sanctions.
Ashmore continues to rank among the largest institutional holders of Venezuelan sovereign debt. Advisory firms such as Houlihan Lokey—financial adviser to the Venezuela Creditor Committee—and Lazard, a veteran of major sovereign restructurings (including Greece and Ukraine), would likely stand to gain from the sheer scale and complexity of any debt workout. In such processes, advisers typically earn success-based fees and function as the “picks and shovels” of restructuring. Venezuela’s debt structure is widely regarded as one of the most intricate ever assembled.
Reviving Venezuela’s oil industry would demand swift rehabilitation of aging infrastructure. Technip, which historically designed much of the country’s core oil facilities, is well placed to play a leading role given its proprietary expertise—particularly if emergency repairs are fast-tracked through sole-source or no-bid contracts. Graham Corporation, a supplier of vacuum ejector systems used in heavy-oil upgrading and refining, could also benefit, since Venezuela’s crude requires vacuum distillation to prevent it from solidifying into coke.
Before exports can meaningfully increase, Venezuela will need to import substantial volumes of diluent (such as naphtha or natural gasoline) to transport its heavy crude through pipelines. Targa Resources, operator of the Galena Park Marine Terminal in Houston—a major LPG and naphtha export hub—would be a natural beneficiary if Venezuela pivots back to U.S. diluent supplies, replacing current inflows from Iran.
The clearest corporate beneficiary of regime change and nation-building in Venezuela is Chevron (NYSE: CVX). Unlike other U.S. energy majors that exited the country, Chevron has maintained an on-the-ground presence. It retains the workforce, regulatory approvals (through OFAC), and operational assets—most notably Petroboscan and Petropiar—that position it to scale up production quickly. Exxon Mobil (NYSE: XOM) and ConocoPhillips (NYSE: COP), both of which hold legacy claims and arbitration awards stemming from past expropriations, could also regain market access or pursue compensation under a revised legal and political framework.
Refiners along the U.S. Gulf Coast—such as Valero Energy (NYSE: VLO), Phillips 66 (NYSE: PSX), and Marathon Petroleum (NYSE: MPC)—were purpose-built to handle heavy, sour crude like that produced in Venezuela. Since the imposition of sanctions, these companies have had to rely on costlier substitute feedstocks. A resumption of Venezuelan supply would reduce input costs and support refining margins, assuming end-product demand remains stable.
At the sector level, a significant increase in Venezuelan output would likely weigh on oil prices, which would be negative for crude producers but positive for consumer-oriented equities. Lower energy prices are inherently deflationary and could translate into lower bond yields—conditions that are generally supportive of risk assets, all else equal.
Note: This section is for analytical purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.
Venezuela: What Comes Next for the Economy and Markets?
In a characteristically Trump-like approach, President Trump initially stated that the United States would “administer” Venezuela during the transition period. U.S. officials later confirmed that approximately 15,000 troops would remain stationed in the Caribbean, with the option of further intervention if the interim authorities in Caracas failed to comply with Washington’s demands.
Venezuela’s Supreme Court subsequently named Vice President Delcy Rodríguez as interim president. A close ally of Maduro since 2018, Rodríguez previously oversaw much of the oil-dependent economy and the country’s intelligence structures, placing her firmly within the existing power framework. She signaled a willingness “to cooperate” with the Trump administration, hinting at a potentially dramatic reset in relations between the two long-hostile governments.
International observers, including the United Nations and the Carter Center, have concluded that Venezuela’s 2024 elections lacked legitimacy and fell short of international standards. Independently verified tally sheets reviewed by analysts indicated that opposition candidate Edmundo González secured around 67% of the vote, compared with roughly 30% for Maduro.
At the same time, María Corina Machado—Nobel Peace Prize laureate and a leading figure in Venezuela’s opposition—is expected to return to the country later this month and has said the opposition is ready to take power. President Trump, however, has publicly cast doubt on the breadth of her support among the Venezuelan population.
In this context, three potential scenarios appear likely, as outlined by Gavekal Research:
“Soft” Military Rule
In the near term, the most probable outcome is the continuation of the current power structure under Rodríguez and the armed forces. For this arrangement to endure, it would likely require a pragmatic shift toward U.S. priorities—embracing a more business-friendly approach and loosening ties with traditional partners such as Russia, China, and Iran. Washington may be willing to accept this scenario if it ensures political stability and reliable access to energy supplies.
Democratic Transition
A negotiated move toward civilian governance would hinge largely on how new elections are structured. Allowing participation from the Venezuelan diaspora could significantly reshape the results, whereas restricting voting to residents inside the country would be more likely to benefit factions linked to the existing regime.
“Libya Redux” (State Breakdown)
The most destabilizing scenario would involve the collapse of central authority, triggering internal military conflict and the proliferation of armed groups. Such an outcome would heighten the risk of civil strife, renewed migration pressures, and severe disruptions to oil production and global energy markets.
Oil prices tumbled in Asian trading on Wednesday after U.S. President Donald Trump said Venezuela would deliver tens of millions of barrels of crude to the United States, a development expected to significantly increase global supply. Prices were already under pressure earlier in the week, as Washington’s takeover of Venezuela fueled expectations of a broad easing of sanctions on the country’s oil sector—potentially releasing tens of millions of barrels back onto the market.
Despite elevated geopolitical risks adding a modest risk premium, oil prices stayed under pressure as markets grew increasingly concerned about a potential supply glut in 2026. Crude was already on track for its steepest annual decline in five years in 2025. Brent futures for March slid 1% to $60.11 a barrel at 20:13 ET (01:13 GMT), while U.S. benchmark WTI dropped 1.1% to $56.29 a barrel.
Venezuela to send 30–50 million barrels of crude to the United States, Trump says
In a post on social media, Trump said Venezuela would transfer between 30 and 50 million barrels of oil to the United States, with Washington planning to sell the crude at prevailing market prices. He added that the proceeds from the sales would be managed by him as U.S. president, stating that the funds would be used to serve the interests of both Venezuela and the United States.
The announcement follows just days after U.S. forces detained Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, when Trump said Washington was taking control of the country and planned to open up its oil sector. Oil prices initially fell after Maduro’s capture, as markets anticipated that a potential easing of U.S. sanctions on Venezuela could unleash large volumes of crude onto global markets. Trump’s actions since then suggest that this outcome is increasingly likely.
However, analysts cautioned that any reopening of Venezuela’s energy industry could take longer than expected, citing risks of political instability and the constraints of the nation’s aging infrastructure. Data from maritime analytics firm Kpler also indicated that a near-term increase in Venezuelan output is unlikely due to limited domestic storage capacity.
Russia-Ukraine ceasefire draws attention as U.S. backs security guarantees for Kyiv
Oil markets were also tracking any fresh developments in talks on a Russia–Ukraine ceasefire after the United States on Tuesday endorsed a largely European-led coalition that pledged to provide security guarantees for Kyiv.
The U.S. commitment was made at a Paris summit aimed at reassuring Ukraine in the event of a truce with Moscow. Washington also said it was prepared to help monitor and verify any ceasefire should an agreement be reached. However, Russia has so far shown limited willingness to engage in a ceasefire, with fighting between the two sides continuing as the war moves toward its fifth consecutive year.
Even so, any prospective ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine could ultimately lead to a rollback of U.S. sanctions on Moscow, allowing additional Russian oil to return to the market. Such a development would also reduce the geopolitical risk premium embedded in crude prices.
The removal of Venezuela’s current leadership would likely signal a sharp shift in Washington’s stated objectives—from a focus on counter-narcotics pressure to a far more ambitious agenda: unlocking one of the world’s largest oil reserves and reopening the country to U.S. energy companies.
“The oil business in Venezuela has been a bust—a total bust—for a long period of time,” U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters on Saturday.
“We’re going to have our very large United States oil companies—the biggest anywhere in the world—go in, spend billions of dollars, fix the badly broken oil infrastructure, and start making money for the country.”
The central question for Trump’s administration is whether political change alone would be sufficient to revive an industry hollowed out by decades of mismanagement, corruption, and chronic underinvestment.
On paper, Venezuela’s oil potential is vast. Government figures put proven reserves at more than 300 billion barrels, the largest in the world, consisting largely of heavy crude prized by refiners along the U.S. Gulf Coast and in parts of Asia.
Analysts note that this heavy crude complements U.S. shale production, which is typically lighter and less suited to certain refinery configurations. In theory, Venezuela’s reserves could once again play a meaningful role in global energy markets.
In practice, however, the obstacles are formidable. Venezuela currently produces less than one million barrels per day—a fraction of its output two decades ago. Infrastructure has deteriorated severely, skilled workers have fled the country, and oil fields, pipelines, ports, and refineries would require massive capital investment merely to restore reliable operations.
Even under optimistic scenarios, years of rebuilding would be required before production could rise meaningfully. Market conditions add another layer of complexity: global oil supplies remain ample, and prices below $60 a barrel reduce the incentive for large-scale, high-risk investment abroad.
U.S. producers must therefore weigh whether capital is better deployed in stable domestic basins rather than in a country with a long history of expropriation and contract disputes.
Legal and institutional reform would also be indispensable. Venezuela would need to overhaul laws governing private investment, restructure roughly $160 billion in sovereign and quasi-sovereign debt, and resolve outstanding arbitration claims stemming from past nationalizations.
Without clear property rights and predictable regulatory frameworks, international oil companies are unlikely to commit billions of dollars, regardless of political change.
Security and governance challenges remain unresolved as well. Removing a leader does not automatically produce stability, and companies will wait to see whether a transitional government can maintain order, protect assets, and establish credible authority across the country.
The scale of reconstruction required extends far beyond oil extraction, encompassing financing, currency stabilization, and the rebuilding of core state institutions.
In that sense, unlocking Venezuela’s oil is ultimately less a question of geology than of politics, economics, and time.
OPEC+ delegates indicated that the group is expected to keep oil production steady at their upcoming meeting on Sunday, despite ongoing political tensions between key members Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as the recent U.S. capture of Venezuela’s president.
The Sunday meeting involves eight OPEC+ members—Saudi Arabia, Russia, the UAE, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Iraq, Algeria, and Oman—who together produce about half of the world’s oil supply. This session follows a challenging 2025, during which oil prices plunged over 18%, marking their steepest annual decline since 2020 amid concerns over oversupply.
From April to December 2025, these eight members raised oil output targets by roughly 2.9 million barrels per day, representing nearly 3% of global oil demand. They agreed in November to pause further output increases for January through March 2026.
According to three OPEC+ sources, Sunday’s meeting is unlikely to alter this policy.
OPEC Faces Multiple Crises Amid Market and Political Challenges
Tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE escalated last month over a decade-long conflict in Yemen, when a UAE-aligned group seized territory from the Saudi-backed government. This crisis sparked the biggest rift in decades between the former close allies, exposing years of divergence on key issues.
Historically, OPEC has managed to navigate serious internal disputes—such as during the Iran–Iraq War—by prioritizing market stability over political conflicts. However, the group now faces multiple challenges. Russian oil exports remain under pressure from U.S. sanctions related to the Ukraine war, while Iran grapples with widespread protests and threats of U.S. intervention.
These overlapping crises put OPEC’s cohesion and its ability to manage the global oil market to a critical test.
On Saturday, the United States reportedly captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Washington would assume control of the country until a transition to a new administration can be arranged, though he did not specify how this process would be carried out.
Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, surpassing even those of OPEC’s leader, Saudi Arabia. However, its oil production has sharply declined over the years due to chronic mismanagement and international sanctions.
Analysts caution that a significant increase in crude output is unlikely in the near future, even if U.S. oil majors follow through on the multibillion-dollar investments promised by President Trump.
THE ETERNAL SOVEREIGN 