The removal of Venezuela’s current leadership would likely signal a sharp shift in Washington’s stated objectives—from a focus on counter-narcotics pressure to a far more ambitious agenda: unlocking one of the world’s largest oil reserves and reopening the country to U.S. energy companies.
“The oil business in Venezuela has been a bust—a total bust—for a long period of time,” U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters on Saturday.
“We’re going to have our very large United States oil companies—the biggest anywhere in the world—go in, spend billions of dollars, fix the badly broken oil infrastructure, and start making money for the country.”
The central question for Trump’s administration is whether political change alone would be sufficient to revive an industry hollowed out by decades of mismanagement, corruption, and chronic underinvestment.
On paper, Venezuela’s oil potential is vast. Government figures put proven reserves at more than 300 billion barrels, the largest in the world, consisting largely of heavy crude prized by refiners along the U.S. Gulf Coast and in parts of Asia.
Analysts note that this heavy crude complements U.S. shale production, which is typically lighter and less suited to certain refinery configurations. In theory, Venezuela’s reserves could once again play a meaningful role in global energy markets.
In practice, however, the obstacles are formidable. Venezuela currently produces less than one million barrels per day—a fraction of its output two decades ago. Infrastructure has deteriorated severely, skilled workers have fled the country, and oil fields, pipelines, ports, and refineries would require massive capital investment merely to restore reliable operations.
Even under optimistic scenarios, years of rebuilding would be required before production could rise meaningfully. Market conditions add another layer of complexity: global oil supplies remain ample, and prices below $60 a barrel reduce the incentive for large-scale, high-risk investment abroad.
U.S. producers must therefore weigh whether capital is better deployed in stable domestic basins rather than in a country with a long history of expropriation and contract disputes.
Legal and institutional reform would also be indispensable. Venezuela would need to overhaul laws governing private investment, restructure roughly $160 billion in sovereign and quasi-sovereign debt, and resolve outstanding arbitration claims stemming from past nationalizations.
Without clear property rights and predictable regulatory frameworks, international oil companies are unlikely to commit billions of dollars, regardless of political change.
Security and governance challenges remain unresolved as well. Removing a leader does not automatically produce stability, and companies will wait to see whether a transitional government can maintain order, protect assets, and establish credible authority across the country.
The scale of reconstruction required extends far beyond oil extraction, encompassing financing, currency stabilization, and the rebuilding of core state institutions.
In that sense, unlocking Venezuela’s oil is ultimately less a question of geology than of politics, economics, and time.
Sources: Investing
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